That’s another one of the issues that came up at the clinic. . . the secrecy [about the use of donor sperm]. There’s an element of secrecy about it in that normally it’s heterosexual couples, and the husband will be the legal father. And of course we [Sarah and her partner Kate] can’t pretend that either one of us is the child’s father. There’ll be no pretence on that.[284]
Sarah’s comment clearly highlights two issues: namely, the legal recognition of a husband’s parental status in relation to his donor-conceived child(ren) and the perceived atmosphere of secrecy around the use of donor insemination by heterosexual couples.[285] I read Sarah’s comment as an acknowledgment of the discursive construction of the legal ‘father’ in Anglo-Welsh legal discourse. Sarah implies that this discursive construction facilitates social fathers ‘pretending’ they are the bio-genetic fathers of donor-conceived children. She also distinguishes between the situation of heterosexual couples and that of lesbian couples using donor insemination. Lesbian couples (including Sarah and her partner Kate) cannot ‘pretend’ that both parents are biologically related to the child in the way that a heterosexual couple may. Consequently naming practices for lesbian parents must be negotiated in a different legal and social context from that experienced by heterosexual partners. It is one in which their families are marginalised and rendered ‘alternative’, but it is also one in which there are no pre-existing ‘rules’ and therefore in which the ‘rules’ might be designed from scratch. It is this space, one in which both normative hostility and transgressive potential must be negotiated, that is informative with regard to status issues for lesbian co-mothers.
Status
Andrea noted the lack of status she was afforded as the child’s co-mother:
It annoys me that [as a co-mother] you’re seen as a nothing. Do you know what I mean? You’ve got no legal rights as a parent if you like, like other people have. I’d really like it if like other couples you could actually adopt,[286] although I’m another woman, I want to be sort of a parent.[287]
There are three interrelated issues raised by Andrea’s comment. First, her status as a co-mother is characterised as being insignificant. Second, Andrea contrasts the lack of legal recognition of her parenting role to the rights she perceives are extended to ‘other’ (ie heterosexual) couples. Finally, in expressing a desire to have formal legal recognition of her parental role — ‘to be sort of a parent — Andrea’s comments highlight the negotiation of kinship terms when articulating issues relating to co-mothers.
Taking together Andrea’s first two points, it is not immediately clear whether Andrea’s observation that she is ‘a nothing’ is meant generally at the everyday level (that is, in terms of her assumption of parental responsibilities, and Louise’s and their extended families’ recognition of her parental role), or strictly in relation to her lack of legal status. However, she states that ‘other’ couples (couples which I read as heterosexual) are accorded legal recognition of their parental role in relation to donor-conceived children. Hence, it would appear that she is referring to the absence of any legal status as the child’s co-mother. The emphasis she places on the significance of formal legal recognition suggests frustration at not being accorded parental status. In addition, it appears to feed into her naming practices, whereby the terms used tend to minimise her role in the child’s life, notwithstanding the responsibilities she undertakes daily.[288] Thus, Andrea indicates that legal discourse has a particularly significant authority in assigning rights and status to parents.