How do individuals define their self-interest? How are people’s desires socially constructed? Do conventional definitions of a separate ‘self’ reflect a masculine view of the world? Some feminists of post-modern persuasion have argued that rational choice is simply an interpretive fiction. Others insist that we need a theory of individual choice that retains at least some emphasis on rationality broadly construed as reasonable, purposeful behaviour.
(Folbre, 1994: 17-18)
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he term ‘choice’ conjures up strong ideas of human agency. The individual is free to select whatever action she or he desires or may discriminate between different available options and pick the most suitable. These ideas extend from purchasing food to selecting a lifestyle. As Plummer (2000: 432) comments: ‘the idea that we are autonomous human beings who can choose the kind of personal life we wish to live has become a deeply entrenched one’. Indicating that how choice is conceptualized and experienced as a lived reality is historically specific, Giddens (1991) suggests that these aspects to choice are bound up with the conditions of late-modernity. For Giddens (ibid.: 2) choice forms part of the ‘new mechanism of self-identity’.
Giddens identifies four influences that give rise to a diversity of choices. First, the signposts of how to act that are commonly found in traditional societies are no longer present. Late modernity is characterized not only by a plurality of choices but also by no guidance as to which choices should be made. Second, late-modern societies contain diverse, segmented lifeworlds. Individuals are surrounded by, and have knowledge of, alternative ways of living. This is, third, reinforced through a global media that brings to the individual an even greater array of milieux. Fourth, in marked contrast to the reasoned certainty of the Enlightenment, the reflexive nature of late modernity is marked by doubt.
Choice is, of course, also entwined with the individualism, rights and freedoms of liberalism. This can be seen in the language of choice that
has come to prominence in recent years in political discourses and policies. For example, the ‘individual’s right to choose’ has been an important aspect of British educational policy. This is evidenced in the development of educational markets and the rhetoric of parental choice (see, for example, Gewirtz et al., 1995). Feminism is no exception in taking up the liberalist discourses of choice. Eisenstein (1993: xiii, emphasis in original) makes this point in relation to feminist theorizing when she comments: ‘Although differences still exist. . . the more interesting point is that significant similarities exist as well. And at the core of all the differences remains ‘‘the’’ liberal feminist recognition of woman as an individual with ‘‘rights’’ to freedom of choice.’
This emphasis on the freedoms and agency of choice has been heavily criticized for not taking enough account of issues of social structure. Walsh (1998: 33) defines structure as a ‘recurring pattern of behaviour [that] has a constraining effect’. Structural issues therefore impact on the autonomy of choice. For example, while a purely agentic account of career choice would suggest that individuals are able to select any form of employment they desire, a structuralist account would highlight how career choices are constrained, for example, by the gendering of women’s and men’s work. The extent to which anyone is absolutely free to choose is therefore called into question. Anderson (1998) provides an example of this from research into the psychology of career choice. She comments:
In couching the issue of occupational behaviour within a choice framework, there is an inherent assumption that all people have to do is choose a particular job or career from a whole array of different options. To operate from this assumption simplifies the issue and implies some kind of deficiency on the part of those who appear to restrict their selection to specific fields. . . educational and occupational choice is a complex process that is significantly influenced by environmental variables. Consequently, the current terminology and framework of choice… is inappropriate. (1998: 145)
Anderson offers the term ‘occupational fate’ as a way of conveying the structuring of choice and to imply that in many cases ‘choice’ is absent.
Nevertheless, structural accounts present the opposite problem to those of autonomy and agency. They are critiqued for being overly deterministic as they give primacy to the power of structural forces that reduce an individual’s freedom of manoeuvre. This, then, leaves us with a problem. This is how we might avoid an analysis that rests within the dichotomy of agency-structure. McNay (2000: 10) comments that feminist attempts to create a balanced account have highlighted how women’s ‘experiences attest to the capacity for autonomous action in the face of often overwhelming cultural sanctions and structural inequalities’. However, she also comments that feminist theorization has replicated the agency-structure dualism of mainstream social theory. This is because theorization has either mainly focused on microsociological accounts of agency or, alternatively, deterministic accounts of structure. Jones (1997: 262) describes social theorists’ attempts to avoid either an overly optimistic account of human agency or an overly deterministic account of social structure as an ‘endless ping-pong’.
The concept of choice is clearly a useful area in which to explore these broader issues of agency-structure. For this reason I shall detail two quite distinct conceptualizations. The first is that of rational choice theory. Rational choice is the central theorization of economics. It privileges the autonomous agent who pursues her or his self-interest. Rational choice accords with many everyday perceptions of choice. Within assumptions of rational choice one has a list of options and carefully selects the most appropriate within the ordinary constraints that exist of, say, time, money or insufficient information. Feminist critiques of rational choice theory offer an excellent example of the problems of agentic accounts of choice. Yet many of these critiques do not appear to go beyond the ‘ping-pong’ identified by Jones.
In contrast, the second conceptualization of choice that is explored is that of the poststructuralist ‘choosing subject’. One of the perceived strengths of poststructuralism is that it offers a way out of the ‘ping — pong’ impasse. In particular, poststructuralism is seen to provide an explanation for resistance and contradiction. An exploration of the ‘choosing subject’ enables us to consider how this is achieved.