An understanding of male and female as distinctly different and complementary to an understanding of male and female as equal was a radical shift in gender ideology.
(Munro, 1998: 52)
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vans (1994) suggests that there are three issues that are central to contemporary feminist conceptualizations of equality. The first is that the most common assumption made about the meaning of equality is that this must mean ‘the same’. Thus feminists have argued that as we are all born equal we should be treated as equals. But, of course, this begs the question ‘Equal to what?’ The measure, or the normative standard, of that equality has been men’s lives. Men had the vote, property rights and access to education and so these became spheres of early feminist campaigning. More recently, feminists have noted how men still maintain their positions at the top of employment hierarchies. As a result, feminist campaigns for equality have sought to break through the metaphorical glass ceiling that prevents access to higher positions.
It is true to say that some of the achievements of feminism have been in terms of accessing the public realms of social life. There are more women in the British Parliament and more women in managerial positions in organizations. In terms of legislative change, it is almost four decades ago that the Equal Pay Act (1963) was passed in the United States. In the UK it is just over three decades ago that the Equal Pay Act (1970) was passed and over a quarter of a century ago that the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) was passed. Despite these changes, parity with men in all of these arenas is yet to be achieved. And, internationally, it should be remembered that such legislation is not a global phenomenon.
However, it is women’s responsibilities in terms of the family that appears to be the most resistant to change and this brings us to the
second issue that Evans highlights as central to feminist conceptualizations of equality. This is that this has focused primarily on achieving equality based on entry into paid labour. A key problem with this is that it has left women’s family responsibilities unchanged. Research has demonstrated how greater access to paid employment cannot be viewed simply as a liberating phenomena that leaves women less dependent on male partners and more fulfilled as individuals. Indeed, it is evident that women either have to manage as best they can the two greedy spheres of paid work and family and/or take part-time, flexible employment with its associated lower economic and social value. This has led to continuing lobbying for a range of policies such as childcare facilities, maternity and paternity leave, flexible working hours, and so forth.
Third, while equality has not disappeared, it has more recently been under sustained critique. For example, the assumption that equality means ‘the same’ has been explored in terms of its political and philosophical implications. The notion that women should view the masculine as the normative, that is as the goal to be achieved, is certainly not one that is ascribed to by all feminists. For example, cultural feminists have sought to valorize the feminine and have argued that women are indeed different to men. Their political goal is to have an equal value placed on women’s difference.
Plumwood (1993) summarizes these positions within discussions of equality in terms of two models. One of these she calls ‘the feminism of uncritical equality’. This is associated with models of feminism in the 1960s and 1970s that ‘attempted to fit women uncritically into a masculine pattern of life and a masculine model of humanity and culture which was presented as gender-neutral’ (Plumwood, 1993: 27). Although this position is mainly associated with liberal feminism, it should be noted that the masculine ideal of selfhood is also found in socialist and humanist-Marxist feminism when the emphasis is placed on the human as a producer or worker (Plumwood, 1993, see also Grosz, 1990b). The second model Plumwood calls ‘the feminism of uncritical reversal’. This is where feminists are seeking to give a higher value to the female side of the female/male binary. This model is mainly associated with the maternalist stance of cultural feminists writing in the 1970s and early 1980s.
This chapter explores these issues and debates and their implications for conceptualizing equality in the following ways. The first two sections that follow are concerned to understand equality as ‘sameness’. The first of these is concerned with the measure of sameness. What is this sameness that is being measured? How is it measured? The second of these is concerned with the legislative impact of liberal perspectives of equal rights. Here I outline measures for individual and group-based rights and the major critiques of these. In the third section of this chapter I turn to some of those feminists who argue that women’s difference is the root of their equality. Here I distinguish between those who could be described as arguing that women are equal but different and those who are arguing that women are equal and different. In the case of the former I outline first — and second-wave theorizing about women’s ‘natural’ calling and higher value as mothers. Here I also illustrate the impact that critiques of essentialism have had on feminist thought. In terms of the latter I outline aspects of Italian feminism.
My final conceptualization is concerned with material inequality. I note here how attention to issues of material inequality has been decreasing. Among other reasons this is because increasing theorization now focuses on aspects of identity and there is considerable recognition given to the complexity and multiplicity of social positioning. This has led to substantial critiques of earlier class-based conceptualizations of material inequality. I offer two examples of contemporary theorization (Fraser, 1995; Bradley, 2000) that attempt to take account of more recent aspects of feminist thought in relation to material inequalities.