Economics in the twentieth century became increasingly restricted to a theory of rational choice in the context of scarcity. . . Feminist economists have been key critics of the individualism and absence of an ethical dimension within mainstream economics.
(Gardiner, 1997: 38)
Becker and Coleman’s work evidence something more than gender — blindness. They evidence a political reassertion that the worthy individual is based within a subjectivity of White, middle-class, masculine rationality. Generally, therefore, feminist critiques draw specific attention to the inherent assumptions of gender, class, ‘race’ and sexuality that are present in rational choice models. For example, Folbre (1994) draws attention to the masculinity within neo-classical economics through her euphemism ‘Mr Rational Economic Man’. R. Williams (1993) notes the dualistic thinking in much theorizing by feminist economists that retain the stable and unified assumptions of the female/ male binary. She calls for a deconstructive approach that racializes theories of gender. Overall, there are three areas where feminist economists focus specific critique. As I shall illustrate, these draw more generally on the feminist literature and are concerned with the gendering of self-interest, rationality and individualism.
As we have seen, an aspect of the subject at the heart of rational choice theory is that of the utility-maximizing individual. Gardiner (1997: 55) thus comments that neo-classical economics has been constructed around the idea of ‘self-interested, self-supporting economic agents who are faced with an array of options from which to choose within the limits of the resources available to them’. This means that self-interest provides the major element, not only for motivating choices but also for the efficient maintenance of the market and indeed for the ‘good’ of all. However, feminist economists point out that within economics the issues of self-interest, individualism and competitiveness are primarily equated with the public economy and market. In terms of individuals in the private economy of the household, the assumption is that these relationships are more harmonious and cooperative (England, 1993; Gardiner, 1997).
In particular, feminists point to Becker’s analysis of altruism as evidence for this. Becker’s choice of the masculine pronoun for the altruist and the feminine pronoun for the beneficiary of this altruism is a stark illustration of the more gendered assumptions underpinning his work. Becker’s depiction of the family ‘calls up a picture of a benign group of generous individuals, banded together in happy union. . . however, [the family in Becker] is more accurately characterized as ‘The Present-Giving Male Dictator and His Selfish Wife’ (Bergmann, 1995: 146). Strassman (1993) points out that Becker’s model contains two old economic fables. These are the story of the benevolent patriarch and the story of the woman of leisure. Thus, the patriarch is engaged in paid work and acts as the necessary regulatory force of the household. As economically inactive, the wife is assumed to be unproductive.
There are two key points that feminist economists draw attention to in this respect. The first is the dualistic framework of public/private that is called upon. The economic model of rational choice assumes that market and household behaviour are essentially different. In the public market people behave competitively. In the private sphere of the home people behave cooperatively. Nevertheless, this suggests a uniform and unique set of behaviours characterized across a clear public/private binary. In the everyday of social relations such a binary falls down. Gardiner (1997: 236) comments in this respect: ‘Economic life, whether in private companies, public sector organisations or households is pervaded by combinations of self-interested behaviour and cooperative endeavour, by conflict and altruism.’
In response to this feminist economists have called for greater consideration to be given to what goes on in families (Cantillon and Nolan, 2001). The ‘benevolent patriarch’ of Becker’s model suggests that ‘Although family members may have conflicting needs, the good provider dispassionately and rationally makes decisions that are in the best interests of the family’ (Strassman, 1993: 58). Issues of power relations are therefore relegated to a model of ‘free choice’. In particular, feminists draw attention to the asymmetrical power relations of households. These asymmetric power relations not only impact on who does what in the household division of labour. They also affect the distribution of other resources, such as food, clothes, access to private health care, and so forth.
The second issue associated with the notion of the utility-maximizing individual is that no account is taken of the gendered construction of self-interest. For example, women who assert their self-interest risk transgressing norms of femininity. They may therefore find themselves in a contradictory position when faced with the need to pursue selfinterest, for example, in relation to employment careers or in terms of their health. In respect of the division of resources within the family, ideologies of motherhood require women to put their children first. Not to do so can reap severe sanctions.
In addition, the linkage of self-interest and rationality is also called into question. Folbre (1994) comments that in economics the term selfishness is often used in such a way as to imply that it is more rational than, say, altruism. Utility-maximization is linked to the individualism and competitiveness of markets. Such an argument would say that given that this is how markets are, it is only rational to behave in ways that will protect and enhance one’s self-interest. In this way, selfishness asserts and confirms, rather than questions, the primacy of the market as a regulator of behaviour. So long as we can be sure that everyone is acting in terms of their utility-maximization, we can ensure the efficiency of the distributive mechanisms of the market.
Such a social system also assumes a notion of rationality as being conceptualized as dispassionate and objective. Here, there is no room for passion and subjective feelings but for a cool analysis of the ‘facts’. For feminists this conceptualization of rationality is equated with the masculine side of the binary where it is contrasted with the association that women are more emotional and subjective. Lloyd (1996) charts women’s changing relationship to conceptualizations of rationality from Aristotle to the present day. She notes how rationality was the mark of distinctiveness that separated humanity from animals. Women as fellow (sic) human beings could not, therefore, logically be excluded from having reason. Nonetheless, up until the seventeenth century, woman’s reason was regarded as inferior to that of men as she was perceived to be more emotional or more impulsive.
It was with the development of Cartesian conceptualizations of rationality in the seventeenth century that woman was fully cast out, so to speak. Descartes developed a conception of rationality that was based on a systematized and orderly method. In so doing, he separated mind from body and reason from emotion. This formulation of rationality as an act of the mind and distinctive from emotion reified the possibilities of polarization:
The search for the ‘clear and distinct,’ the separating out of the emotional, the sensuous, the imaginative, now makes possible polarizations of previously existing contrasts — intellect versus the emotions; reason versus imagination; mind versus matter. . . the claim that women are somehow lacking in respect of rationality, that they are more impulsive, more emotional, than men is by no means a seventeenth century innovation. But these contrasts were previously contrasts within the rational. What ought to be dominated by reason had not previously been so sharply delineated from the intellectual. The conjunction of Cartesian down-grading of the sensuous with the use of the mind-matter distinction to establish the discrete character of Cartesian ideas introduces possibilities of polarization that were not there before. (Lloyd, 1996: 154, emphasis in original)
It is important to note that many feminist responses do not reject the notion of a rational consciousness that forms the essence of the humanist subject (Weedon, 1997). For example, Walkerdine (1990) and Lloyd (1996) illustrate how we can understand the development of feminist activism as a response to this polarization. Thus, given it was necessary to be trained in reason, liberal feminist responses are such that access to reason through education and training, should be opened up to women. Alternatively, some feminists argue that reason needs to be imbued with feminine values and our conceptualizations of reason should include feelings and intuition. Hekman (1994) summarizes feminist critiques of rationality as being unified with postmodernists in terms of a concern with language and discourse. As ‘Concepts formed from the male point of view create a male reality; both the real and the rational are defined in exclusively male terms’ (Hekman, 1994: 52). For Hekman this means that the root cause of women’s oppression ‘is rooted in male-dominated language and a male definition of reality’ (ibid.: 53).
These responses to the Man of Reason are present in feminist economists’ arguments. For example, England (1993: 49) refers to rationality as ‘the most ‘‘sacred’’ neoclassical assumption of all’. In addition, the assumption that competitive individualism and utility-maximization are rational ways of being in the world has been questioned from a moral and ethical viewpoint. England argues for an extended meaning to be given to rationality that includes issues of connection as well as separation. Nelson (1993) calls for economics to use the tools of ‘imaginative rationality’. She suggests that this form of rationality would neither be masculine nor feminine but would be centred on how individuals, in interaction with others and their environment, provide for their survival and health.
Finally, feminists have highlighted how problematic the notion of methodological individualism is. Rational choice theory places considerable emphasis on the agency or autonomy of individuals with a consequent neglect of the structuring of choice. When it comes to issues of social structure, rational choice theorists presume that ‘Those features of social life that are conventionally called ‘‘social structures’’ are. . . simply chains of interconnected individual actions’ (Scott, 2000: 135). This means that explanations for social structures within rational choice theory are based on the cumulative results of individual processes at the micro level. At the group level, the family or firm for example, the group is taken as an agent, or individual, in its own right. Strassman (1993: 60) comments in this respect that the hidden assumptions of the ‘free choice’ model are: ‘(1) people are independent agents and unique selves, taking only their own needs and wishes into account; (2) people are able and responsible for taking care of their own needs’. Strassman notes that economists do not deny that these assumptions are problematic but they also view them as fairly benign. She remarks that these assumptions may fit the experiences of adult, White, male, middle-class American economists but they do not fit the economic realities of many others. Thus ‘Economic theory’s conception of selfhood and individual agency is located in Western cultural traditions as well as being distinctly androcentric. Economic man is the Western romantic hero, a transcendent individual able to make choices and attain goals’ (ibid.: 61).
Folbre (1994: 51) uses the term ‘structures of constraint’ to critique the reductive nature of methodological individualism. These structures of constraint are related to issues of ‘race’, class, age, gender and ability and together they ‘form a complex social edifice in which individuals and groups operate’ (ibid.: 53). Folbre argues that the term ‘rational choice’ should be replaced with the term ‘purposeful choice’. She argues that this change of language would mark a departure away from strict rationalist assumptions and would avoid the dichotomy of rational/non- rational. It would also encourage economists to focus on how people define and pursue their desires.
These agency-structure issues that are central to feminist critiques of rational choice theory are more fully explored in poststructuralist perspectives of the ‘choosing’ subject. It is to these that I now turn.