Throughout the Choshn Dynasty (1392—1910), Confucian ideology had defined marriage as a relationship forged between two families (see Choi in this volume). In other words, a commitment of marriage signified an alliance between two families whether as a strategy to expand influence in the region or to smooth relations between rival factions. Individuals were defined by their position in the family as fathers, sons, mothers, and daughters within the wider network of extended kinship relations. Individual preferences or romance had little relevance in this patriarchal system whether for women or men. The impact on women, however, was more severe because of patrilocal practices which required a woman to move into her husband’s household after marriage in order to serve his extended family. As a new member of the household, she was placed at the bottom of the family hierarchy to spend ‘three years as if blind, three years as if deaf, and three years as if dumb’ (Ch’oe et al. 2001: 50). Only with the birth of a son who would continue the patrilineal line could she secure a solid position within the family. While the colonial period had introduced modern concepts of ‘love marriage’ based on freedom of choice in marriage and divorce, unwritten customary rules often trumped what was already a selective application of the Civil Code imposed by Japan (Yang 1998: 41).
It was not until the systematic introduction and enforcement ofnew legislation after liberation in North Korea that there was a large scale transformation in marriage practices. The Gender Equality Law declared equal rights between men and women, including freedom in marriage and divorce (Y. Kim 1947). The full text of the law reads:
Article 1: Women have equal rights to men economically, culturally, socially, and politically in all areas of life of the nation.
Article 2: Women have the same rights as men to vote and be elected in the regional as well as the highest national organs.
Article 3: Women have the same rights as men to worker rights, equal wages, social insurance, and education.
Article 4: Women, like men, have the right to free marriage. Unfree and forced marriage without the consent of those marrying is prohibited.
Article 5: When it becomes difficult to continue the married relationship, women have the same rights as men to free divorce. The right to litigation to demand child support payments from the ex-husband is acknowledged, and such cases shall be processed at the People’s Court.
Article 6: The legal marriageable age shall begin at seventeen for women and eighteen for men.
Article 7: Polygamy is a feudal practice from the Middle Ages and sales of women as wives or concubines are hereby prohibited as evil practices that violate women’s rights. Licensed prostitution, private prostitution, and the kisaeng [female entertainer] system — kisaeng licenses and schools — are prohibited
Article 8: Women have the same rights as men to inherit property and land, and women have the right to be given their share of property and land in case of divorce.
Article 9: All Japanese imperial laws and regulations pertaining to Korean women’s rights are null and void as of the promulgation of this law. This law takes effect as of the day of promulgation.
Almost half of the entire legislation dealt with marriage and divorce, in articles 4 to 8. It was the first indication that the family would continue to play a central role in North Korean society.
More telling than the Gender Equality Law were the Regulations on the Implementation of the Gender Equality Law issued six weeks later, on 14 September 1946, stipulating that all marriages and divorces be registered with local authorities. Despite the principle of free marriage and divorce embodied in the Gender Equality Law, marriages had to be registered, and nonregistered marriages, including common law marriages, were not recognised. This was in stark contrast to other socialist revolutions in Russia and China, which initially liberalised marriage by doing away with the distinction between registered and non-registered marriages, while making divorce as simple as a unilateral declaration by the one seeking divorce without the consent of the spouse. By contrast, in North Korea, articles 10 to 22 of the Regulations contained detailed procedures for divorce (Pak 1989: 422). In cases of consent by both parties, divorce papers could be filed with the local People’s Committee, but if either party disagreed the couple had to file for legal divorce proceedings with the appropriate People’s Court. Divorce would only be granted if the court concluded that continued married life was impossible due to adultery, health or political reasons. In addition, there was a hefty fine for those filing for divorce more than twice, acting as a disincentive to repeat divorces, although this could be waived at the court’s discretion. By March 1956, divorce required legal proceedings even in cases of mutual consent (Yun 1991: 75). Recent anecdotal evidence, however, indicates that divorce regulations have been liberalised since the late 1980s, allowing couples to divorce without court proceedings (Pak 2003: 305). As a result, the rate of divorce has reportedly been on the rise since the late 1990s. In 2002, the average number of official divorces per year stood at 2,000; still a minuscule number for a population of 24 million (CEDAW 2002: 35).
North Korea has held the family to be the basic unit of society and people were mobilised specifically around the idea of the nation as an extension of the family. Instead of regarding the family as something to be overthrown, certain ‘feudal’ marriage practices were targeted as ‘backward’ and in need of reform. On 24 January 1947, the Law to Eradicate Remnants of Feudal Practices was announced, consisting of four articles which all dealt with so-called ‘feudal’ marriage practices (Pak 1989: 425). Article 1 outlawed practices of dowry exchange, stipulating up to a year of forced labour or a substantial fine for exchanging money, animals, labour, or other valuables on marriage. Article 2 guaranteed freedom in marriage by providing up to two years in prison for those who forced a woman into marriage or into maintaining a marriage, as well as anyone who deceived a woman into marriage. Article 3 banned child marriage by imposing forced labour on anyone who married a person not yet of legal marriageable age: 17 for women and 18 for men. Finally, Article 4 prohibited polygamy by stipulating a fine or forced labour for up to a year for anyone who practiced polygamy. As a result, these practices were quickly eradicated within the first years of North Korea’s founding, and marriage customs were drastically simplified.
While match-making through relatives, friends, and co-workers continued to be popular among the older generation but now with the added step of verifying individual consent, the younger generation has increasingly veered toward romantic relationships, finding their marriage partners on their own by dating (Pak 2003: 293). Recent reports estimate that about 70 per cent of marriages are ‘love’ marriages as opposed to arranged marriages (Jung and Dalton 2006: 754). Instead of dowry exchange, the groom is responsible for providing housing while the bride prepares household items. Since housing is generally provided through the workplace under the socialist system, the bride’s family may have a greater financial burden in this regard (Pak 2003: 297). Traditional practices of elaborate wedding rituals involving gift exchange and multiple days of festivities have been replaced by simplified ceremonies. Twenty to fifty guests may gather at one family’s home or a public hall to participate in a simple ceremony. The groom wears a suit or military uniform and the bride dresses in the traditional chosonot (or hanbok in South Korean terminology) — a long skirt and a high-waisted top (Lee 1976: 76; Halliday 1985: 54). With the simplified ceremony, weddings are no longer occasions to show off family wealth, a moot point in a supposedly classless society.
While the legal minimum age of marriage was set at 18 for males and 17 for females, official policy has encouraged people to marry after they have finished their studies and military service, fulfilling their responsibilities to society. The majority of men reportedly marry in their late twenties to early thirties while women marry in their mid-to late twenties (Pak 2003: 301). The difference in the minimum marriage age has been noted by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) as a possible breach of gender equality. North Korea — a state party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) since 2001 — does not, however, consider the age difference to be a form of discrimination, citing the trend of late marriages, women’s earlier ‘physiological maturity’, and most women ‘choosing’ to marry older men (CEDAW 2005a: 3; 2005b: 4). During the examination of its first report to the Committee in 2005, North Korea was reportedly reviewing the possibility of amending its laws to bring it in line with the Committee’s recommendations to equalise the marriage age. North Korea has not, however, engaged with the Committee since then.
Although North Korea’s social revolution was meant to establish a classless society, family background continues to be one of the most important factors in selecting a spouse as there is one class that is discriminated against: the descendants of former landlords, pro-Japanese collaborators during colonial rule, pro-American collaborators during the Korean War (1950—53), and people with relatives who have fled to South Korea (Lee 1976: 73). Marriage with anyone associated with this ‘impure’ class is avoided, and most people marry those from similar family backgrounds (Pak 2003: 326). More recently, there are indications that economic capability has overtaken family background as the most important quality in a partner since the devastating famine of the mid-1990s which killed an estimated one to two million people (Pak 2003: 295). Otherwise, the selection of marriage partners is much like elsewhere, involving a combination of factors including physical attraction, social standing, education, and compatibility — with an added emphasis on public service. Couples seek their parents’ blessing, although this is not required by law, and approval by the local party official is a must if they hope to climb the social ladder. Love and marriage continue to be communal affairs rather than private ones.
While hierarchical relations between husband and wife seem to be particularly acute in the relatively conservative countryside, as often reflected in the testimonies of refugees and defectors, working women with professional careers (who tend to be under-represented among these populations) seem to have relationships of equality and camaraderie with their spouses. Indeed, an ethnographic study of North Korea in the 1970s went so far as to conclude that the ‘relationship between husband and wife appears to be so greatly changed that it is no longer a relationship of clear-cut authority and submission. Love and mutual understanding are now greatly emphasised as desirable between husband and wife’ (Lee 1976: 82). Lee went on to state that ‘cooperation and solidarity between husband and wife are stronger than ever, and marital life based upon genuine “comradeship” is highly valued’ (1976: 83).
Under the law, freedom of marriage and divorce were instituted early on in North Korea, but there are social pressures to marry and stay married, especially when there are children in the family. Consequently, there are few options for those who wish to be free from marriage by choosing not to marry at all. Likewise, there are no options for non-heterosexual unions as article 8 of the Family Law stipulates that ‘marriage shall be undertaken between a single male and a single female’ (CEDAW 2002: 34). As I discuss below, the heterosexual family has been the basic unit of North Korean society and those that reject this family are regarded as antisocial and abnormal.