If the tongzhi movement in the 1990s aimed at identity and community building, the movement in the 2000s has gradually moved on to building sexual citizenship. The HKSAR government actively promotes the family as a core value in Hong Kong society and as an essential part of ‘Chinese culture’. The first Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa (1997—2005) said that ‘our society has always recognised the importance of the family’ (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 2001). The second Chief Executive, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen (2005—12), said that ‘Family harmony is the foundation of social harmony. The Government will continue to enhance family cohesion with effective policies’ (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 2006). The Family Council (2007) was therefore set up to promote ‘family core values as a main driver for social harmony’ (Family Council, 2012).
This harmonious family model has the monogamous heterosexual nuclear family as its prototype, which is not so much the continuation of traditional Chinese culture (as polygyny was the norm) but more of a Christian (especially evangelical) ideal. As Wong (2013) argues, since 1997, a new generation of evangelical Christians has taken up the mission to revive a strong Christian presence and monitor social development through the establishment of organisations such as The Society of Truth and Light (1997), Hong Kong Sex Culture Society (2001), Hong Kong Alliance for Family (2003), New Creation Association (2003), and Family Value Foundation of Hong Kong Limited (2007). These groups, which Wong calls ‘evangelical activism’, have a strong resemblance to the US Christian Right movement. In particular, they focus on sexuality as the central issue to advance their political agenda and emphasise the necessity to protect the dominance of the monogamous heterosexual nuclear family in order to restore social order and public morality. Moreover, while only 10 per cent of the general population is Protestant or Catholic, 75 per cent of the top administrative positions in the government are held by Christians. Hence, Wong argues that Protestantism and Catholicism have a certain influence over Hong Kong policy making (Wong, 2013).
It is under this ‘trinity of governance’ that we can see the struggle of the tongzhi movement in the 2000s. The Sexual Orientation Discrimination Ordinance (SODO) discussion (2005) could be regarded as the first major battle between evangelical activism and the tongzhi movement. In 2004, the SAR government started surveying the level of public acceptance of different sexual orientations. The Hong Kong Alliance for Family posted a four-page newspaper advertisement in the Mingpao newspaper, with nearly 10,000 signatures on 29 April 2005 calling for public opposition to the proposed legislation, as they worried that passing the law would promote an ‘unhealthy’ lifestyle and erode ‘family values’. As a result of strong opposition, the discussion was dropped, even though discrimination against tongzhi has been observed in different social arenas such as schools, workplaces, and churches, as documented in the report ‘Naked Truth: Report on Equal Rights of Hong Kong Tongzhi’ (2006), presented by four NGOs: The Hong Kong Christian Institute, Blessed Minority Christian Fellowship, Civil Rights for Sexual Diversities, and F’ Union. In the same year, the first International Day against Homophobia (IDAHO) event was launched not just to commemorate the date when the World Health Organisation removed homosexuality from its classified list of mental disorders in 1990 but also to respond to the evangelical activists’ opposition to equal protection for all.
The most significant legal challenge to laws concerning homosexual behaviour (conduct-based claim) was Leung TC William Roy v Secretary for Justice (2005), where the High Court found the unequal ages of consent for homosexuals (21) and heterosexuals (16) to be unconstitutional. The second Chief Executive Donald Tsang, himself a Catholic, publicly opposed the court’s decision and made an appeal, though the Court of Appeal confirmed the High Court’s decision in 2006.
In 2009 the Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence Ordinance, a more relationship-based claim, was enacted to include same-sex couples in its scope of protection. The original domestic violence ordinance was first enacted in 1988 to provide civil remedies to protect heterosexuals — married or cohabiting — from partner abuse. In 2008, the government proposed to expand the scope of the legislation to include same-sex couples. Evangelical activists mobilised supporters (in the name of the pro-family movement) to encircle the Legislative Council and sent letters to schools to urge parents to lobby the government. They argued that such amendments, if passed, would be interpreted as recognising and promoting same-sex unions. The ordinance was finally enacted, but had its name changed from the ‘Domestic Violence Ordinance’ to the ‘Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence Ordinance’, in order to make the distinction that cohabitation does not equal marriage, thereby indirectly disqualifying same-sex couples and relationships as valid family forms and valid intimate relationships.
The judicial review filed by W (W v Registrar of Marriages) in 2009 is worth noting, as this is the first legal challenge to the institutionalised injustice regarding relationship-based rights. ‘W’ was an individual born male who underwent sex reassignment surgery in a public hospital but was denied the right to marry her boyfriend. Although her name and gender on her identity card and academic records had been changed, the government refused to change the record on her birth certificate, which is the basic proof of identity necessary to register a marriage. The Court of First Instance denied her right to marry her boyfriend in 2010. Three points have to be highlighted in the judgment (HCAL 120/2009; W v. Registrar of Marriages 2010): (1) legal sex is defined biologically and at birth; (2) W’s case might open possibilities for same-sex marriage; and (3) public consultation and legislation, instead of judicial intervention, is the preferred remedy. Subsequently, W filed an appeal in 2012 (CACV 266/2010; W v. Registrar of Marriages 2012) after struggling with a previous dismissal to do so. Finally, W won a landmark victory on 13 May 2013, when the Court of Final Appeal ruled that legal provisions forbidding her right to marry her boyfriend were unconstitutional and stated that one’s sexual identity should not only be defined biologically at birth (FACV4/2012; W v. Registrar of Marriages 2013).
In facing these external obstacles, what have been the major developments in tongzhi communities since 1997? New groups have been formed such as Rainbow of Hong Kong (1998), Rainbow Action (1998), Civil Rights for Sexual Diversities (1999), F’ Union (1999), Tongzhi Community Joint Meeting (TCJM) (1999), Women’s Coalition of HKSAR (2003), Nutong Xueshe (2005), Midnight Blue (2005), For My Colours (2008), and Gay Harmony (2009). They have been vocal and proactive in fighting for various tongzhi sexual citizenship rights. Moreover, the pink economy has expanded (for example, a local free gay magazine Dim Sum has a long list of venues and places at http://dimsum-hk. com/). The visibility of tongzhi in popular culture such as community online television channels, internet radio programmes, tongzhi websites (for instance, www. gayhk. com,www. tt1069.com, and http://blur-f. freebbs. tw/index. php) and tongzhi writings has increased (Kong 2011: 64—66; Tang 2012). Perhaps the most visible events are the two mass parades started in 2005 and 2008 respectively, namely the IDAHO — Hong Kong Parade and the Hong Kong Pride Parade.
The primary quest of IDAHO is to eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation, which is reflected in the themes highlighted throughout the years, ‘Turn Fear to Love’ (2005), ‘Stand Up Against Prejudice’ (2006), ‘Legislation is the Best Education’ (2007), ‘Gender Diversity, No Discrimination’ (2008), ‘Stand Up for Your Rights’ (2009), ‘Religion, Homophobia and Transphobia’ (2010), ‘Born this Way’ (2011), and ‘What to Fear?’ (2012). The number of participants has steadily increased from 500 to 1,000, as reported by the organisers. A pride parade has been held every year since 2008, except in 2010, due to the organisers’ financial difficulties. Compared with IDAHO, whose principal agenda is to eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation, the aim of the pride parade is to celebrate queer identity and pride, seek inclusion and justice, and challenge heteronormativity (Kong 2011: 59), which is reflected in its themes, e. g. ‘Queers are Ready’ (2008), ‘Be Proud Be Yourself (2009), ‘For Queer. For Love. For Equality’ (2011) and ‘Dare to Love’ (2012). Over the years, the number of participants has steadily increased from around 1,000 in 2008 to 4,000 in 2012, as reported by the organisers.
Both events are considered to be symmetrical and complementary as the former focuses on countering homophobia and transphobia while the latter emphasises taking pride in one’s sexual identity (Wong 2007: 607; Kong 2011: 57). They promote not so much an identity politics but rather a post-identity politics in bringing tongzhi and non-tongzhi together with different interests (Kong 2011: 58). Both events attract tongzhi-friendly groups (the Association for the Advancement of Feminism), human rights groups (Amnesty International), and the business sector (Community Business). A social group HKFS Social Movement Resource Centre even organised ‘straight supports tongzhi’ (2008—9) and ‘straights support grassroots tongzhi’
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Figure 13.1 Hong Kong Pride Parade, 2011. Photograph by Travis Kong. |
(2010), in the hope of connecting the tongzhi movement with a wider nexus of social movements. IDAHO and the pride parade have tended to reject the homogenising effects of identity politics, fashioning a kind of politics of difference to celebrate diversities and advance post-identity politics to draw wider audiences in civil society. This kind of coalition politics can be traced back to the early development of lesbian/queer women’s NGOs which were closely related to the feminist organisations and movement in Hong Kong in the 1990s (King 2001). All these efforts have paved the way for the construction of tongzhi citizenship in Hong Kong.
As in the UK and the US, a politics of difference encourages diversity but also breeds divisionsPlummer 1999). In the early 2000s a more radical queer politics emerged whose aims are not to seek inclusion in the heteronormative mainstream culture or to perform as good and respectable citizens, but to stage more confrontational actions, with an ‘in-your-face’ attitude intended to attract media and public attention. For example, Rainbow Action engaged in a sham marriage in which two gay men (dressed as brides) married two lesbians (dressed as grooms) (2002). They staged a kiss-in action at the Hong Kong Catholic Cathedral of the Immaculate Conception Sunday mass to condemn the Roman Catholic Bishop Joseph Zhen for publishing two articles against same-sex marriage (2003). Most of these actions were largely disapproved of by either the general public or the tongzhi community as some would argue that they ‘brought shame to the tongzhi community’. Through such actions, they have offered an alternative strategy of behaving ‘badly’ and transgressing limits, using strategies similar to US groups like ACT UP and Queer Nation and UK groups like OutRage.
Discussion and conclusion: The fourth wave? 2012In this chapter, we have examined the complex interplay between the tongzhi movement and the wider society, highlighting struggles for sexual citizenship within three key sites of governance: the government, the family, and religion (in particular evangelical activism).
Using Richardson’s (2000) theorisation of sexual rights, we have argued that local tongzhi have only achieved the status of partial citizens in terms of conduct-based, identity-based, and relationship-based rights claims. Concerning the conduct-based claims, the decriminalisation of male homosexual conduct in 1991 and the overturning of the unequal age of consent laws between homosexuals and heterosexuals in 2005 mean some recognition of the right of gay/bisexual men to participate in private and consensual sexual activity. However, the right of transgender people to sexual self-determination is still far from being achieved (Cheung 2010). Concerning the identity-based claims, although public gay bashing is rare in local history, the right to disclose sexual identities is still not legally protected. Concerning the relationship-based claims, the enactment of the Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence Ordinance in 2009 does not signify the public validation of same-sex relationships. Given that there is no provision for same-sex marriages or civil partnerships, it is obvious that local LGBT are not entitled to access any social and legal benefits accruing from being married or partnered.
When we consider these three pillars of sexual rights we see that local tongzhi are restricted from being full Hong Kong citizens. However, such blockages of citizenship status brought by the ‘trinity of governance’ should not be seen as some totalising site of domination without any loopholes. For example, the establishment of the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) is crucial in promoting messages of equality, diversity, and a discrimination-free society. Lam Woon-kwong, the then chairperson of the EOC, has clearly stated that ‘the EOC has all long been advocating legislation to protect the LGBT community from discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity’ (Equal Opportunities Commission 2012). The newly appointed chairperson Dr. Chow Yat-ngok said in a radio interview that he promised to make legislation to protect gay rights a top priority during his three-year term (South China Morning Post 1 April 2013). Moreover, the Boys’ & Girls’ Clubs Association of Hong Kong has formed a parents’ group to help parents support their tongzhi children. Su Mei-zhi, who worked with the group as a journalist, gathered nine stories from this group and published a book entitled Our Tongzhi Child (2012). She argued that the tolerance of homosexuality could be reconciled with the traditional values of Chinese family (Wong 2007). Finally, the Protestant/Catholic community is not entirely monopolised by evangelical activist groups. The Society for Truth and Light has sometimes been labelled a ‘moral Taliban’ in the media (The Encyclopedia of Virtual Communities in Hong Kong, www. evchk. wikia. com) and even among the Christian community. In response to Rev. Lam Yi-lok from the Crossroad Community Baptist Church, who used biased analogies like cancer patients, drug addicts, and robbers to ‘explain’ homosexuality from his pulpit, some local churches issued a joint declaration and organised a press conference entitled ‘Homosexuality is Not Sinful’ to oppose any speeches and behaviours that stigmatised and demonised the tongzhi community. Bearing these examples in mind, we are not saying that the ‘trinity of governance’ in Hong Kong is weakening. Rather, these developments may point to the possibility of a post-identity politics that aims to establish alliances and coalitions among all parties.
The year 2012 was a critical year that witnessed the intensification of internal schisms and the revival of ‘coming out’ politics. The internal disputes among the tongzhi community have become more intense, seemingly resulting in the separation into two movement camps — the Tongzhi Community Joint Meeting (TCJM) and For My Colours (FMC). Their confrontation was triggered by the IDAHO 2012 where TCJM, as the Hong Kong rally organiser, invited Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee (chairperson of the New People’s Party) to be one of the spokespersons. However, the coalition members of FMC criticized Ip for her poor record, alleging that she had disdained the core values of human rights, the rule of law and social justice, and had shown discrimination towards lower class people. From FMC’s point of view, the tongzhi movement should not only target the rights of sexual minorities, but should be part of the wider civil society, embracing the values of democracy, equality, freedom, and fraternity, in order to align with other socially disadvantaged groups such as new immigrants, ethnic minorities, sex workers, disabled persons, and grassroots manual labourers. The controversy over Ip suggests an ideological spilt that defines the fourth wave of the tongzhi movement in Hong Kong, which is less between assimilationist and confrontational politics or between identity and post-identity politics but more to do with the role that tongzhi politics should play in the wider social justice movement. It is therefore a debate over whether the tongzhi movement should align itself with anti-globalisation, anti-capitalism, anti-consumerism, and anti-discrimination movements. Moreover, when we examine the title of the street forum organised by the FMC, this is, ‘Who has stolen our tongzhi movement?’, there are several questions worth asking: Who is the ‘who’? Does it refer to the TCJM? Who is the ‘our’? Does it refer to civil society, the general tongzhi community, or FMC? What has been stolen in the tongzhi movement? Does it refer to the agenda, leadership, resources or something else? The title seems to touch upon the ownership of the local tongzhi movement. Does it imply that our tongzhi movement has been lost and we need to look for a new one? So, what do we need in the tongzhi politics? How can alliances be possible and is it necessary to have such internal collaboration? Who is a tongzhi and who is not? All these questions have ultimately turned to the critical question: what kinds of tongzhi politics should we refashion? We speculate that the movement may shift from a minority identity-based movement focusing exclusively on the rights and benefits of tongzhi, to a coalition of issue — based movements that call for alliances between different parties — tongzhi or not — under the broad umbrella of a democratic and social justice movement.
Although coming out is not a new tactic in tongzhi politics, three public figures, Anthony Wong Yiu-ming, Denise Ho Wan-see (also known as HOCC), and Raymond Chan Chi-chuen, who all publicly came out in 2012, and later set up a new group called Big Love Alliance, have generated a great stir in Hong Kong. In fact, the significance of their coming out is not a matter of personal disclosure but a symbol of public transgression to challenge the social morality and justice of our society. As an openly gay pop singer, Wong’s activism is not limited to the rights of LGBT, but also touches upon other issues such as concerns over the death of disabled dissident Li Wang-yang in mainland China, and protest against the HKSAR government’s implementation of moral and national education in primary schools in Hong Kong, which has been read as brainwashing and political indoctrination. Wong is therefore a symbolic figure who represents the transformation of a queer icon into an icon of social justice. HOCC recently came out at the Pride Parade 2012 and it is believed that she will follow Wong’s style of activism. As the first and the only ‘out’ elected politician in Hong Kong and the entire Chinese-speaking world, Chan’s coming out is of vital importance in attracting public attention, especially from the Protestant/Catholic and tongzhi community. After discovering Chan’s gay identity, some conservative Christian groups immediately expressed worries about the possible advocacy of a tongzhi agenda. In contrast, tongzhi groups have pinned their hopes on a possible victory for tongzhi equality at the legislative level. We argue that Chan’s provocative stance together with his openly gay identity may change the ecology of the local tongzhi movement, leading to a new wave of ‘culture wars’ between different parties (Wong 2013). Moreover, a new group called Hong Kong Scholars Alliance for Sexual and Gender Diversity (2013) has just been formed by a group of teachers and academics who are concerned with sexual and gender issues in Hong Kong. They are scholars who research sexuality and gender and/or self-identify as LGBT. The alliance aims to provide and facilitate education, research, training and support for sexual and gender diversity in order to build a more open and progressive society.
To conclude, no one wants to be a non — or partial citizen in society. In Hong Kong, the making of tongzhi citizenship is a socio-political process, which has been subsumed under the ‘trinity of governance’. On 7 November 2012, Legislative Council elected member Cyd Ho raised a motion urging the government to launch a public consultation on enacting legislation to safeguard equal opportunities and basic rights for people of different sexual orientations, but the motion was rejected. This and other cases suggest that the government does not intend to take initiatives in implementing any policies concerning sexual rights. Evangelical activists, together with some parents and NGOs, have shared similar arguments to oppose any forms of legislation towards tongzhi equality. Apart from illustrating the constraining effects of such governance, this understanding of the fourth wave of tongzhi movement has presented us with a dual challenge. Firstly, the intensification of internal schisms among tongzhi groups has made the ideological divides become more visible. Even if no one group dominates the movement in the foreseeable future, we argue that the Hong Kong tongzhi movement seems to be moving towards a broader democratic and social justice movement. The tongzhi movement is therefore not just concerned with tongzhi issues, but with alliances with other minorities along the lines of such things as age, gender, race and ethnicity, occupation, and class. Secondly, the revival of ‘coming out’ politics brought by Wong, Chan, and HOCC represents a form of queer visibility that is not only in the media sector but also in the socio-political sector. Such transformations of queer icons, however, may lead to a societal backlash from conservative religious communities. It is thus expected that increasing queer visibility in the political arena may pose new challenges for Hong Kong and the tongzhi movement.