A number of scholars well versed in biology and evolutionary theory have critiqued sociobiology (Gould, 1976; Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Kitcher, 1987; Lewontin, 1979; Travis & Yeager, 1991). In brief, they argue that the major flaws of a simplistic sociobiology include (a) errors in description, such as arbitrary clustering of disparate elements of behavior into common categories; (b) the concept of progressive optimization which suggests that everything observed is adaptive; (c) reconstructing versions of prehistoric arrangements that are unknowable; and (d) reasoning by tautology and the argumentative technique which suggests that if a causal connection is plausible then it must hold true.
The misapplication of sociobiology involves taking the description of the individual and the unique and making leaps of interpretation and application to the general and the universal. This most often takes the form
of what has been called pop sociobiology, a form that detracts from the serious interpretation of the subdiscipline (Kitcher, 1987). Kitcher argues that it is obviously more difficult to defend a generalized application of theory than it is to support singular examples or the behavior of individual species, and criticizes those who have popularized simplistic explanations. Kitcher further argues that it is impossible to separate the possibility of cultural transmission from biological determinants, and therefore it is unlikely that any one evolutionary theory can explain the behavior of all humans.
Pop sociobiologists believe that fundamentals of human nature can be discovered, that they can be shown to be universal, that if universality can be established it must be adaptive, and that anything universal must be inherited (Hubbard, 1990). As applied to human culture, this view supports the notion of promiscuous behavior in men as being adaptive, when in reality there is no evidence that promiscuous men have more offspring than men who invest heavily in the nurturing of their children.
Even before sociobiological concepts were formalized into a new discipline they were apparent in standard psychological research and theory. For example, Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, and Gebhard (1953) commented in their volume, Sexual Behavior in the Human Female, on the apparent “naturalness” of extramarital affairs among men, but not women. (Presumably the women with whom these men have affairs are excluded from the psychological analysis that makes illicit sex abhorrent to women.) They commented that “it may be a fact that the males’ extra activities do not do so much damage to a marriage, or the wives may be more tolerant of their husbands’ extramarital relations, or the wives may not comprehend the extent to which the male activities are actually affecting the stability of their marriages. Contrawise, like the true mammal that he is, the male shows himself more disturbed and jealous and more ready to take drastic action if he discovers that his wife is having extramarital relations” (p. 436). They implied that men and women are more accepting of male permissiveness, and that perhaps women do not have the mental capacity to comprehend the true nature of the situation. Obviously Kinsey and his cohorts were searching for confirmation of what they already suspected about men and women. There is a clear tendency to find what one expects to find in empirical sex research.
In The Psychology of Sex, Eysenck (1979) used sociobiological concepts to explain an apparent greater acceptance among men for having many sexual partners. In regard to reproductive potential, Eysenck maintained that “males gain from having many mates, while females have nothing to gain from having multiple partners. .. hence they [men] compete for the opportunity to fertilize women” (p. 45). The implicit control of women is apparent as well in his view: “Men of course do invest parentally to some extent, and hence it is in their interest to protect themselves from cuck- oldry, which would involve them in investing in the genes of other men” (P- 45).