Difference

Emblazoned on book covers, routinely invoked in intellectual debates, ‘difference’ functions as an unassailable value in itself, seemingly irrespective of its referent or context. Difference has become doxa, a magic word of theory and politics radiant with redemptive meanings.

(Felski, 1997: 1)

he centrality of difference within social and cultural theory has led Moore (1994: 2) to remark that there is ‘an obsessive concern with issues of difference, and such is the malleability of the term that almost anything can be subsumed under it’. Barrett (1987) uses the term ubiquitous to portray the extent and frequency of difference in feminist theorizing. Similarly, Evans (1995: 6) remarks: ‘One oddity of ‘‘differ­ence’’, both within the debate and elsewhere in feminist thought, is that it would appear to be endlessly invoked, but again, often is not defined.’ Of course, this issue of definition has been taken up in a variety of ways. For example, Moore explores this ‘passion’ for difference in terms of its linkage to ‘its unspoken and under-theorized pair, ‘‘the same’’ or ‘‘sameness’’’ (1994: 1). Weedon (1999) undertakes a review of differ­ence in terms of liberal, radical, lesbian, socialist, Black and postcolonial feminisms. Hekman (1999) argues for a new approach to issues of method and truth that will offer alternative theories of difference.

Despite this multiplicity of conceptualization and approach there is a major narrative of difference in feminist theory. Indeed, this narrative confirms Bacchi’s (1990) concern with over-simplified views of feminist history as it suggests a simple three-stage, linear progression that denies the variety of perspectives existent at varied points in history. Felski (1997) sets this out in the following terms. Felski notes that the origins of feminism are commonly ascribed to the writings of Mary Wollstone — craft who set out to argue against the first difference. That is that there is a difference between women and men. As we have seen, Wollstone- craft argued that women shared a common humanity with men. This

no-difference position was challenged by gynocentric second-wave feminism. This sought to reaffirm women’s difference from men. In so doing it was claimed that the goal of equality upon which the first difference was based was illusory and masked a phallocentric logic. Nevertheless, poststructuralist and identity politics have since high­lighted the political biases and exclusions of such gynocentricism or woman-centred feminism. This has critiqued feminism as mainly concerned with White, middle-class, Western issues. It has also called into question the notion of a unified subjectivity of womanhood.

Felski notes that this narrative is told on many occasions and in a number of ways. However, there are two main evaluations that are made about the story of difference in feminist theorizing. On the one hand, there are those who see this story as a narrative of progress away from essentialist and universalist ideals and towards more sophisticated understandings. Woman is no longer understood as a unified whole but as a process, as fragmented, as in flux and as multiple. On the other hand, there are those who see this story as contributing to the demise of feminism as a movement. This is because the attention that has been paid to deconstructing womanhood has left feminism without a unifying identity. If ‘woman’ ceases to exist, who are we fighting for?

This narrative is evident in the conceptual schema of difference set out by Barrett (1987) and Evans (1995) (see Table 3.1 and Table 3.2). Both Barrett and Evans suggest that there are three main categories of difference. However, while their categories share some similarities, there are also significant variations. These arise from the underpinning theoretical frameworks upon which Barrett’s and Evans’ categorizations rest. Evans’ schema draws on particular schools of feminist thought, such as cultural, liberal and postmodern feminism. Barrett’s schema also draws on these schools of thought but the basis of her delineation is located in the specificity of difference that she has identified. In parti­cular, Barrett separates experiential, positional and sexual difference and locates these differences across the traditional schools of feminist thought. For example, sexual difference has been explored within cul­tural and poststructural feminist approaches.

Specifically, and for her purposes, Evans suggests that there are three schools of difference (see Table 3.1). These are:

1 Valuing woman’s difference from man (the ‘weak’ and the ‘strong’ versions of cultural feminism).

2 Differences between groups of women (identity politics).

3 Differance or the difference within (postmodernism and poststruc­turalism).

Barrett remarks that the variety of meanings attributed to ‘difference’ results in confusion. Because of this confusion Barrett argues that sexual difference, positional difference and experiential diversity are best iden­tified separately. Barrett’s first category of difference, that of difference as experiential diversity, is a combination of Evans’ first two differ­ences. This is because experiential diversity is central to why feminists have distinguished woman’s difference from man and have found differences in terms of ‘race’, class, disability, and so forth between groups of women. Barrett’s second category of positional difference concurs with Evans’ postmodernist and poststructuralist difference. Barrett’s third category, that of sexual difference, is not included in Evans’ initial schema. This third category focuses on psychoanalytic theories. Thus, Barrett’s schools of difference are: ‘(I) a sense of differ­ence effectively to register diversity of situation and experience between women; (II) difference as an understanding of the positional rather than absolute character of meaning, particularly as developed in Derridean terms, and (III) modern psychoanalytic accounts of sexual difference’ (1987: 30).

Maynard (1995: 262) comments: ‘a rather obvious point to make about the way in which feminist thought has been classified is that there is no real consensus as to which categories are the most meaningful, how many there are and which writers are to be located within each’. Both Evans and Barrett note the difficulties and dilemmas that they experienced in constructing these frameworks. For example, Evans comments that her categories may be strait-jacketed positions that do not necessarily hold when applied to actual texts and may indeed split specific schools of thought. Barrett notes that her categories are in some ways artificial and indeed overlap. The difficulties that Evans and Barrett have experienced in terms of categorization and the potential overlaps and cross-cutting ties between their different ‘differences’ are also evident in the organization of this chapter. For example, it should be noted that some cultural difference, sexual difference, identity school and postcolonial theorists also use poststructuralist approaches. What is important to comment on here is that labelling of this kind should not be understood as an accurate representation of some kind of empirical reality that can be found in the literature. Rather, it operates as a heuristic device that allows us to explore and explicate particular issues and points.

This chapter explores and extends the categories of difference set out by Evans and Barrett. In particular I explore Evans’ three differences and indicate the overlaps with Barrett. I then outline sexual difference. Finally, I explore conceptualizations of difference within postcolonial theorizing. Neither Barrett nor Evans deal directly with this form of difference. This comment is not made to criticize them. Rather, it is to draw attention to the importance of reading with the date of publication in mind. Postcolonial theorizing, while not ‘new’, has recently become more visible within broader discussions of feminist thought. Indeed, it is beginning to take on a ‘received’ narrative structure that I am conscious of replicating in this chapter!